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DETERMINANTS OF JUDICIAL WAIVER





The selection of jurisdiction for adjudicating juvenile crime to-
day is one of the most controversial debates in crime control policy,
reflecting differences in assumptions about the causes of crime and
philosophies of jurisprudence and punishment. For adolescent of-
fenders, especially violent youth whose behaviors may pose particu-
lar social danger, critics view the traditional goals of the juvenile
court and the "best interests of the child" standard as being at odds
with public concerns for retribution and incapacitation of criminals.
The choice between jurisdictions is a choice between the nominally
rehabilitative dispositions of the juvenile court and the explicitly pu-
nitive dispositions of the criminal courts.' The choice reflects differ-
ences between sentencing policies that assign primary importance
to the individual and those that accord greater significance to the
seriousness of the offense committed and the goal of proportional
punishment.
Critics of the juvenile court's rehabilitative policies suggest that
the court's sanctions for violent crimes are not only inappropriate
and disproportionate for the seriousness of the crimes, but also inef-
* This research is supported by Grant 85-MU-CX-0001 from the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department ofJustice. The opinions are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies or views of the Department of
Justice. The authors are grateful to Cary Rudman and Eliot Harstone for their
contributions to this research.
** Associate Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers-The State University of
New Jersey.
* * * Research Sociologist, UCLA Drug Abuse Research Group, University of California
at Los Angeles and Consultant, The RAND Corporation.
1 Whitebread & Batey, The Role of Waiver in Juvenile Court: Questions of Philosophy and
Function, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING: READINGS IN
PUBLIC POLICY 207 (J. Hall, D. HamparianJ. Pettibone, &J. White eds. 1981) [hereinaf-
ter MAJOR ISSUES].
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fective in deterring subsequent crime. 2 They contend that the crim-
inal court, with its punitive sanctions, is the more appropriate forum
for adjudicating violent crimes by juveniles whose offense and be-
havior patterns should mandate lengthy incarceration in secure fa-
cilities.3 The critics further argue that treatment programs for
juvenile offenders are ineffective, thereby negating the purpose of
the juvenile court.4 The seriousness of violent juvenile crimes sug-
gests that these adolescents can be neither controlled nor rehabili-
tated in the juvenile justice system.
In contrast, supporters of the juvenile court argue that violent
juvenile crime is a transitory behavioral pattern, which is unlikely to
escalate to more serious or persistent crime.5 They argue that ado-
lescent offenders benefit from treatment services that pose only a
minimal threat to public safety while avoiding the lasting stigmatiza-
tion of criminal justice processing.6 Finally, many proponents ofju-
venile justice processing of violent delinquents do not accept the
criticisms of rehabilitative programs, arguing instead that weak eval-
uation research or poor program quality mask the natural strengths
ofjuvenile corrections.
7
While this policy debate continues on the appropriate judicial
forum to adjudicate violent crimes by adolescents, over forty states
have passed laws since 1978 that restrict the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court.8 The limits imposed on the juvenile court's jurisdiction,
as well as the statutory and procedural approaches employed to de-
termine which adolescents should be subject to criminal laws, vary
2 Wolfgang, Abolish the Juvenile Court, 2 CAL. LAw. 12 (Nov. 1982); Feld, Delinquent
Careers and Criminal Policy: Just Deserts and the Waiver Decision, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 195 (1983).
3 See, e.g., J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (2d ed. 1983); C. MURRAY & L. Cox,
BEYOND PROBATION: JUVENILE CORRECTIONS AND THE CHRONIC DELINQUENT (1979). The
critics argue that the incapacitative sanctions of the criminal court provide greater com-
munity- protection, more effective deterrence of future crime, and more proportionate,
retributive responses to violent behaviors.
4 Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Punishment, Treatment and the
Difference It Makes, 68(5) B.U.L. REV. 821 (1988).
5 D. HAMPARIAN, R. SCHUSTER, S. DINITZ &J. CONRAD, THE VIOLENT FEW: A STUDY
OF DANGEROUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1978); D. HAMPARIAN, R. SCHUSTER, J. DAVIS, &J.
WHITE, THE YOUNG CRIMINAL YEARS OF THE VIOLENT FEW (monograph prepared for the
Office of Juv. Just. & Delinq. Prevention, Dep't of Just., 1985) [hereinafter D.
HAMPARIAN, THE YOUNG CRIMINAL YEARS]; Rojek & Erickson, Delinquent Careers, 20 CRIM-
INOLOGY 5 (1982); Shannon, Risk Assessment vs Real Prediction: The Prediction Problem and
Public Trust, I J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 159 (1985).
6 Gendreau & Ross, Revivification of Rehabilitation: Evidence from the 1980s, 4JUST. Q.
349 (1987).
7 Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of Violent Juvenile Crime, 17 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 93 (1990).
8 Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile
Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987).
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among states. Some states have lowered the age ofjurisdiction for
criminal court, either for all offenders or for selected offense catego-
ries.9 Other states have expanded the basis for transfer of cases
from juvenile to criminal jurisdictions, either by expanding the crite-
ria for transfer or shifting the burden of proof from the state to the
defendant.' 0 Still others have established concurrent jurisdiction
for selected offenses or offenders, giving prosecutors broad discre-
tion over the choice of forum." These differences have significant
effects on the number and types of youths waived to criminal
court. 12
Yet, there is little empirical guidance to determine the age
threshold and offense or offender eligibility criteria for criminal
court, or to inform continuing efforts to redefine the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court. Similarly, no one has undertaken to systemati-
cally examine the most appropriate age-crime relationship to deter-
mine which sanctioning forum is most effective in avoiding
recidivism and safeguarding public safety.' 3 In addition, few studies
have examined the decision processes for transfer' 4 of juveniles to
criminal court. 15
Yet, only by analyzing the possible determinants of transfer for
9 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 180.75 (McKinney 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§ 632(a) (1989).
10 See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:4-11 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (An-
derson 1990).
11 See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS § 712A.4 (1990); FLA. STAT. § 39.02 (1988).
12 See D. HAMPARIAN, R. SCHUSTER, J. DAVIS & J. WHITE, YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS:
BETWEEN Two WORLDS (monograph prepared for the Office of Juv. & Delinq. Preven-
tion, Dep't ofJust., 1982) [hereinafter D. HAMPARIAN & R. SCHUSTER, YOUTH IN ADULT
COURTS].
13 See D. FARRINGTON, L. OHLIN & J. WILSON, UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING
CRIME: TOWARD A NEW RESEARCH STRATEGY (1986). They argue that little is known
about the relative sentence severity or the effectiveness of sanctions for cases transferred
to criminal court, nor whether increased deterrence, retribution, or incapacitation re-
sults from transfer. Nor has the literature on sentencing generally addressed the struc-
tural-contextual effects of court jurisdiction by comparing juvenile and criminal court
sanctions. Moreover, the few studies that have compared adolescent offenders in juve-
nile and criminal court have relied on heterogeneous samples of violent and nonviolent
offenders that were channeled from juvenile to adult jurisdictions. Thus, selection bi-
ases consistently have compromised comparisons of the two types of proceedings.
.4 Transfer, bindover, certify, remand, refer and waive are all words used inter-
changeably to describe the process whereby a youth, through a petition filed in the juve-
nile court, ends up in the criminal justice system to be tried as an adult.
15 See, e.g., Keiter, Criminal or Delinquent? A Study ofJuvenile Cases Transferred to the Crimi-
nal Court, 19 CRIME & DELINQ 528, 529 (1973) (claimed absence of decision standards
and operational definitions of the statutory criteria "invites abuse"); Eigen, The Determi-
nants and Impact ofJurisdictional Transfer in Philadelphia, in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 1, at
333 (found racial disparities in transfer decisions for interracial homicides-Afro-Ameri-
can defendants were transferred significantly more often if the victim was white).
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juveniles charged with felony offenses in the criminal and juvenile
courts, can appropriate plans for legal reform proceed from an em-
pirical base. The study reported here examines the judicial transfer
decision in four urban juvenile courts for youths charged with vio-
lent offenses. More generally, it addresses the issue of criteria for
transfer-that is, it examines the threshold of adolescence, or fac-
tors that the courts invoke to decide when a child no longer is a
child. In addition, the research and policy questions address the fol-
lowing issues: first, which offense and offender attributes influence
the judicial decision to transfer; second, whether these variables are
consistently applied in the transfer decision; and third, to identify
the implicit transfer policies based on the operationalization of sub-
jective criteria and the relative contributions of objective and discre-
tionary criteria to transfer decisions. The conclusions address the
legal and policy implications of differential determinants of transfer,
and suggest criteria and procedures for invoking waiver as an ulti-
mate or last resort juvenile court sanction.
In order to set this study in a broader historical context, the
following sections provide a brief review of the philosophical and
epistemological distinctions that separated the juvenile and adult
courts, the concerns that led to the restructuring of the juvenile
court, the issues surrounding the judicial transfer of juveniles to
adult court, and recent developments in statutes authorizing judicial
transfer.
A. HISTORICAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL
COURTS
The first juvenile court in the United States was established
nearly a century ago. 16 Traditional historical accounts suggest that
the social reformers who helped spur the creation of the courts were
motivated by a progressive ideology that stressed both "humanitari-
anism" and positivistic beliefs that behavior was amenable to reha-
bilitation. 17 Recognizing the difficulty of convicting and punishing
16 Juvenile offenders have been treated separately and differently since the beginning
of English common law in the 12th century. See Thomas & Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles in
Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439 (1985).
The English common law recognized a legal distinction between juvenile and adult of-
fenders based on arguments that juveniles lacked the moral development and reasoning
capabilities of adults. That is, juveniles were thought to have not reached the spiritual
attainment of adults, and accordingly could not distinguish right from wrong.
17 See D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNA-
TIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980). In contrast, critical theorists suggest- this was
part of an historical process of the search for new forms of legal and social control in
response to increasing rates of crime and delinquency as unfortunate by-products of
1990] 317
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juveniles in the criminal justice process, the social reformers advo-
cated a separate legal setting to provide juveniles with individual-
ized treatment. 18 Throughout its subsequent history, the juvenile
court has maintained a goal of rehabilitation of the individual, and
made custody and punishment a secondary goal in the pursuit of
"remaking the child's character and lifestyle."' 9
The development of a separate juvenile court also reflected a
fundamental distinction between sanctions based on characteristics
of the offender and punishment based on the offense. The parens
patriae philosophy emphasized treatment, supervision, and control,
rather than the traditional punitive responses of the criminal law.
Juvenile proceedings were defined as civil rather than criminal, and
therefore less stigmatizing. 20 Furthermore, juvenile court disposi-
tions were designed to determine why the child was in court, and
what could be done to avoid future appearances. 21 The juvenile
court thus eschewed the technical rules of evidence and procedure
to ensure that all information about the offender was available,
22
rather than narrowly focusing on the facts of the case. The juvenile
court's goal was to resolve the wayward youth's family, social, and
personal problems and prepare the youth to be a healthy, produc-
tive, and law abiding adult.
The central justification for the separation ofjuvenile and adult
jurisdiction is the distinction between punishment and treatment.
Whereas punishment involves the imposition of burdens (i.e., depri-
vation of liberty) on an individual for the purposes of retribution or
deterrence, treatment focuses on the present and future well being
of the individual. Disproportionate responses to comparable indi-
viduals were tolerated if underlying factors or mitigating circum-
stances were found. To prevent contamination ofjuvenile offenders
urbanization, industrialization, and increased immigration to fill the needs for industrial
workers. See A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969).
18 Similarly, the "Progressives" of the late 19th century thought that the causes of
juvenile and adult crime differed. Alljuvenile crime was viewed as resulting from exter-
nal forces such as inadequate socialization within families rather than the deliberate ex-
ercise of free will. This unicausal theory negated distinctions between types of behavior.
See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 17. The Progressives further believed that the youths, who
did not possess the maturity to appreciate fully the wrongfulness of their actions, merely
needed moral guidance or social reform to resume a normative developmental path.
19 See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 17; Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 16.
20 See Schlossman,JuvenileJustice: History and Philosophy, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
AND JUSTICE 961 (S. Kadish ed. 1983).
21 E. RYERSON, THE BEsT-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT
(1978).
22 See Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes injuve-
nile Waiver Statutes, 78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987).
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by adult criminals, youth were detained and treated in separate facil-
ities. The distinctions between juvenile and criminal sanctions thus
were not limited to the nature of the proceedings, but to the very
distinction between treatment and custody.
B. RESTRUCTURING THE JUVENILE COURT
The traditional separation of juvenile and criminal jurisdiction
established the age of eighteen as the age threshold at which the
young offender would be held liable for criminal actions. Eighteen
years old thus became the statutory threshold of childhood for pur-
poses of selecting a judicial forum to adjudicate illegal behaviors.
However, recognizing that certain offenders under the age of eight-
een may not be amenable to the rehabilitative dispositions of juve-
nile court, the juvenile court judges were granted broad
discretionary powers to waive jurisdiction and send young offenders
to the criminal courts.23
Recent years have brought challenges to the boundary between
juvenile and criminal jurisdiction. Two sources of criticism have
converged in calling for a restructuring of the juvenile court, with
special emphasis on increasing its procedural formality while nar-
rowing its jurisdiction. First, critics suggested that the procedural
informality and offender-based decision process threatened the due
process rights of juveniles, 24 often resulting in inequitable disposi-
tions. Second, proponents of deterrence and incapacitation policies
criticized the juvenile court as ineffective at controlling violent juve-
nile crime. A series of damaging studies on the apparent weakness
of rehabilitation programs negated the rehabilitative purposes of
the juvenile court.2 5 Furthermore, the statutory limitations on pun-
23 The early statutes left the decision to waive jurisdiction to the court's discretion,
and placed no procedural limitations on the exercise of that discretion. See Whitebread
& Batey, The Role of Waiver in Juvenile Court: Questions of Philosohy and Functiofi, in MAJOR
ISSUES, supra note 1 at 207. Today, the standards for determining the appropriate judi-
cial forum for disposition ofyoung offenders remains inconsistent from state to state. See
D. HAmPARiAN & R. SCHUSTER, YoUrTH IN ADULT COURTS, supra note 12; Rudman, Hart-
stone, Fagan & Moore, Violent Youth in Adult Court: Process and Punishment, 32 CRIME &
DELINQ. 75 (1986) [hereinafter Rudman]; Feld, supra note 22.
24 See United States v. Gault, 381 U.S. 1 (1967); United States v. Kent, 383 U.S. 541
(1966); Whitebread & Batey, supra note 23; Bortner, Traditional Rhetoric, Organizational
Realities: Remand ofJuveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIME & DELINO. 53 (1986).
25 See Feld, supra note 22 (emphasizing the limitations ofjuvenile court dispositions
in stopping the recurrence of violent crimes by juvenile offenders). See also Bailey, Cor-
rectional Outcome: An Evaluation of 100 Reports, 57 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE
Sci. 153 (1966); D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, &J. WILES, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORREC-
TIONAL PROGRAMS: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975); Robison &
Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DELIN0. 67 (1971); THE REHA-
BILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (L. Sechrest, S. White &
1990] 319
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ishment in juvenile court were criticized as inappropriate given the
seriousness of violent crimes by adolescents and the public danger
from juvenile violence. 26
1. Redefining the Threshold of Adolescence
Recent legislation suggests that the traditional age boundary of
eighteen years old for criminal liability may be modified by specific
behaviors. For example, a fifteen year-old offender who commits a
violent offense may be held criminally responsible, while his or her
cohort remains a juvenile if violations of law are less serious. Thus,
recent legislation reducing the age threshold for criminal liability
has created an age-behavior gradient for legal definitions of
childhood. 2
7
Offenders below the threshold age for "adulthood," or criminal
liability traditionally have been viewed as "amenable to treatment,"
and suitable for interventions designed to change either the factors
that precipitated the offenses or the offending behaviors them-
selves.28 Juvenile justice "sanctions" are thus designed to remedy
the underlying causes of youthful misconduct while retaining the
youth under state control (in loco parentis). Sanctions in the criminal
justice system, however, focus on retribution, deterrence, or inca-
pacitation, with only minimal efforts directed at rehabilitation.
2 9
2. The Due Process Revolution
In response to several Supreme Court decisions, a rapid move-
ment was begun in the late-1960s to both formalize juvenile court
procedures and strengthen the punitive element of juvenile court
sanctions. The Court in United States v. Kent,30 after finding that the
E. Brown eds. 1979); Wright & Dixon, Community Prevention and Treatment ofJuvenile Delin-
quency: A Review of Evaluation Studies, 17J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 35 (1977).
26 See JUVENILE COURT LAW REVISION COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT (Cal. Atty. Gen'l
Office 1984).
27 See Conrad, Crime and the Child, in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 1, at 179.
28 Although the state is responsible for ameliorating the antecedent conditions that
gave rise to the criminal acts, the methods employed vary. Recent efforts to incorporate
corporal punishment into the treatment services are based on the notion that such "so-
cial learning" is part of the rehabilitative process. For a discussion of the social meaning
of sanctions, see Jensen & Erickson, The Social Meaning of Sanctions, in CRIME, LAW AND
SANCTIONS: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 119 (M. Krohn & R. Akers eds., 6 Sage Re-
search Series in Criminology, 1978).
29 The intent of criminal court is to inflict punishment through deprivation of liberty
in harsh but humane surroundings. The type and severity of punishment is primarily
determined by the severity of the crime committed, mediated by the defendant's crimi-
nal history as well as mitigating circumstances and background.
30 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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informality of the juvenile court violated due process guarantees,
extended to juveniles the principle of due process for waiver or
transfer hearings, and raised questions about the rehabilitative ele-
ment ofjuvenile court dispositions.31 Similarly, in In re Gault,32 the
Court granted juveniles the rights to receive notice of charges
against them, to legal representation, to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, to avoid self-incrimination, and to appeal court decisions.
Later decisions introduced procedural regularity, adopted "beyond
a reasonable doubt" as the standard of proof, and raised evidentiary
standards and due process concerns to an equal status with the
"best interests of the child." s3 3 Moreover, these actions initiated
questions about the "best interests" philosophy, and whether it in
fact substantively benefited juvenile offenders or the public. The re-
sult was greater attention to procedural formality, and in turn, to
offense-specific dispositions.
3 4
3. Serious Juvenile Crime and the Failure of Rehabilitation
Another challenge to the separate juvenile justice system was a
consequence of rapid increases in juvenile crime rates in the 1970s,
especially violent juvenile crime. Serious and violent juvenile crime
rose steadily from 1974-79, and again in 1980-81. 35 Critics of a sep-
arate juvenile jurisdiction linked these increases to the ineffective-
ness of rehabilitative programs; these criticisms were fueled by
repeated findings that directly attacked the positivistic foundations
of the juvenile court-that treatment interventions could forestall
further juvenile offending.36
The specific critiques of the juvenile court took three forms.
First, sanctions in juvenile court were feared to be less certain or
severe (or inappropriately lenient, based on crime severity) than in
criminal court, creating a "leniency" gap in punishment and retribu-
tion.3 7 Second, the persistently high rates of violent juvenile
31 Id. at 555, 560-62.
32 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
33 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971).
34 See Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes injuve-
nile Waiver Statutes, 78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987).
35 Strasburg, Some Recent National Trends in Serious Juvenile Crime, in VIOLENTJUVENILE
OFFENDERS: AN ANTHOLOGY 5 (R. Mathias, P. DeMuro & R. Allinson eds. 1984); Weiner
& Wolfgang, The Extent and Character of Violent Crime in America, 1969 to 1982, in AMERICAN
VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN UPDATE OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES
AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 17 (L. Curtis ed. 1985).
36 See supra note 25.
37 See, e.g., Roysher & Edelman, Treating Juveniles as Adults in New York: What Does It
Mean and How Is It Working?, in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 1, at 265 (finding evidence that
1990]
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crime 38 led to the belief that rehabilitative dispositions in juvenile
court were ineffective in curtailing further crime and violence. Fi-
nally, juvenile court sanctions were presumed to pose greater risks
to the public from (inappropriately) shorter terms of incarceration,
compared to the lengthy sentences meted out by the criminal
courts. Accordingly, the primary motivation for relocating violent
crimes by adolescents to the jurisdiction of the criminal court was
the severity and length of sentences that could be imposed. 39
Serious and violent juvenile offenders thus became the focus of
contemporary debates on the efficacy of the juvenile court. The be-
haviors of violent adolescents suggest that they have attained an age
where they may no longer be amenable to the "rehabilitative" min-
istrations of the juvenile court. The reduction of the age of majority
for certain classes of offenses and offenders further suggests either
that they have attained adulthood (as shown by some aspect of their
behaviors), or the risks to the public are too great not to regard
them as adults in adjudicating their crimes.
4. Criminalizing Adolescent Violence: Reducing the Jurisdiction of the
Juvenile Court
The perceived weakness of rehabilitation prompted the legisla-
tures, juvenile corrections agencies, and the courts to adopt new
young felony offenders in the criminal court in New York were treated less harshly due
to their youthful standing as compared to older offenders with longer criminal histo-
ries). However, evidence of a leniency "gap" has not been found in other studies. See P.
GREENWOOD, A. ABRAHAMSE & F. ZIMRING, FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY FOR
YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS (monograph prepared for Nat'l Inst. of Just., U.S. Dep't of
Just., Aug. 1984), who, after comparing sanction severity for adolescents in juvenile and
criminal courts in three jurisdictions, found no evidence of a "leniency gap" for young
offenders in the criminal court. See also Rudman, supra note 23, who found no differ-
ences in either sanction probability or sentence severity for violent youths retained in
juvenile court with other violent adolescents transferred to criminal court.
38 For over two decades, young males 16 to 18 years of age have had the highest
arrest rates (per 100,000) of robbery and burglary. Weiner & Wolfgang, supra note 35,
at 27. Cohort studies that identified that criminality was concentrated among a small
number of chronic offenders further implicated the rehabilitative programs in the juve-
nile system as failing to effectively alter repeated violent behavior. See Shannon, Risk
Assessment vs Real Prediction: The Prediction Problem and Public Trust, 1 J. QUANTrrATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 159 (1985); M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A
BIRTH COHORT (1972); D. HAMPARIAN, R. SCHUSTER, S. DINrrz &J. CONRAD, THE VIO-
LENT FEW: A STUDY OF DANGEROUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1978).
39 However, the primary motivation was not always realized in application. See Rud-
man, supra note 23 (concluding that incarceration of violent adolescent offenders was
equally likely in juvenile and criminal court, though terms of incarceration were longer
in criminal court); see also D. HAMPARIAN & R. SCHUSTER, YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS, supra
note 12 (finding that for other offenses, particularly serious property crimes, the period
of incarceration from criminal court was no more serioius than what likely would have
been received in juvenile court).
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strategies to strengthen the severity and certainty of sanctions for
violent juvenile offenders. The results include the adoption of both
determinate sentencing statutes40 and administrative guidelines
mandating minimum terms of placement in secure care. The effect
of determinate sentencing and mandatory confinement laws, such as
those enacted in New York,4 ' California,42 and Colorado,43 has
been to remove the discretion in disposition, placement, and release
decisions from "traditional" juvenile justice authorities (i.e., judges,
juvenile corrections agencies or parole boards) to the legislative
forum.4
4
More common, however, are efforts to remove or exclude "dan-
gerous" or violent offenders from juvenile court jurisdiction. This
has occurred in two ways. First, several states have eliminated juve-
nile jurisdiction for specific age/offense/offender categories, while
reducing the age of majority for specified serious, violent, or repeat
felony offenders. 45 The transfer "decision" in these locales is thus
extremely sensitive to, if not determined by, the prosecutor's charg-
ing decision.
Second, other states have expanded the prosecutor's discretion
to chose the adjudicatory forum by establishing concurrent jurisdic-
tion that permits prosecutorial waiver. In Michigan, Florida, and
Massachusetts, for example, prosecutors may elect the court of orig-
inal jurisdiction for certain categories of adolescent offenses and of-
fenders, often with some restrictions or guidelines imposed
40 For example, the state of Washington has enacted sweeping legislation mandating
specific types and lengths of punishment for juvenile delinquents. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.40.010 (1990).
41 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.02 (McKinney 1990).
42 Cal. Penal Code § 1170 (West 1990).
43 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-804 (1990). These state laws specify certain classes of
offenses (usually violent crimes) or offenders (often persistent offenders) for placement
in state corrections agencies for minimum terms.
44 However, considerable discretion remains with judges for dispositions outside the
guidelines. One example is the "manifest injustice" clause of the Washington statute.
Analyses of juvenile court dispositions found that the manifest injustice clause was in-
voked in nearly 65% ofjuvenile court dispositions, usually to increase sanction severity
where the formula otherwise dictated either a less serious placement or a shorter incar-
ceration term than thought proportionate or justified by the judge for the offense or
offender characteristics. For an analysis of the application of this option, see Schneider
& Schram, The Washington State Juvenile Justice System Reform: A Review of Findings, 1 CRIm.
JusT. POL'v REV. 211 (1986).
45 See Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes inJuve-
nile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987). For example, in New
York, certain felony offenses for youth 14 or older originate in criminal court. See N.Y.
CRIM. PRO. LAW § 1.20(42) (McKinney 1990). Homicide cases for youths 13 years of age




Finally, and most common, many states have simplified the pro-
cedures and eased the criteria for transfer (waiver, remand) to crimi-
nal court jurisdiction. Since 1978, over forty-one states have passed
legislation to expand the use of transfer. The offense categories
have been expanded, age eligibility reduced for some or all offense
types, and other criteria (e.g., "heinousness of the offense," "dan-
gerousness to the community," "amenability to treatment") have
been simplified or added to facilitate the transfer of juveniles to
criminal court for prosecution. 47
In certain jurisdictions, the systematic application of
prosecutorial discretion may relocate certain classes of offenses and
offenders from juvenile to criminal court. In two urban juvenile
courts, Phoenix and Miami, for example, prosecutors routinely file
waiver (transfer) motions, most often granted, to relocate specific
classes of juvenile cases to criminal court.48 The intent is either
longer sentences in secure environments, and/or an earlier start in
the accumulation of a criminal court record. Again, the actions of
prosecutors reflect a lack of confidence in the sanctioning certainty
(patterns) and conditions in the juvenile jurisdiction.
C. TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT
One of the most extreme responses to serious juvenile crime
involves the transfer ofjuveniles to adult (criminal) court for prose-
cution. In all but two states, ajuvenile court judge is empowered to
decide, with varying degrees of statutory guidance, whether or not
to transfer certain juveniles charged with specified offenses to adult
court for prosecution.49 The judicial decision to waive a youth to
criminal court recognizes that for certain offenses and offenders, ju-
venile justice system sanctions may be insufficient to accomplish the
twin goals of punishment and rehabilitation. Waiver statutes as-
sume, moreover, that some youths are simply beyond rehabilita-
tion-that is, they are not amenable to treatments aimed at
46 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4 (1990); FLA. STAT. § 39.02 (1988); MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 119, § 61 (1990).
47 For example, New Jersey passed transfer legislation in 1983 explicitly shifting the
burden of proof on "amenability" and "dangerous" from prosecutors to defense coun-
sel. NJ. REV. STAT. § 2A:4A-26 (1982). Accordingly, the defense counsel now must
disprove prosecutorial allegations that an adolescent is ineligible for juvenile
jurisdiction.
48 See Rudman, supra note 23; D. HAMPARIAN & R. SCHUSTER, YOUTH IN ADULT
COURTS, supra note 12.
49 See D. HAMPARIAN & R. SCHUSTER, YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS, supra note 12.
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behavioral or characterological change in the juvenile justice
system.
Transfer is a severe sanction, with potentially harsh conse-
quences: an extended detention in jail, a protracted adjudicatory
process, a felony conviction resulting in social and legal sanctions,
and a lengthy sentence at a secure correctional institution.50 Zimr-
ing5' and Emerson 52 regard waiver as a sanction of last resort for
the juvenile court because of its low incidence, severity of likely pun-
ishment, and its ultimacy. 53 Accordingly, the transfer decision does
more than choose a judicial forum for an accused youth. It invokes
a jurisprudential philosophy that governs the nature of the proceed-
ings as well as the purpose and severity of the sanctions. It also
raises the important issue of when a child is no longer a child, spe-
cifically whether factors other than age are relevant for removing
some youth from juvenile court jurisdiction.
Most of the early juvenile court statutes contained some refer-
ence to waiver of jurisdiction.54 Certain youth, described as
"chronic," "serious," "violent," "sophisticated," "mature" or "per-
sistent" were thought to be out of the purview of the rehabilitative-
oriented juvenile court.55 Early statutes gave the juvenile court ab-
solute discretion to dismiss a delinquency petition and transfer a
youth to the criminal justice system.56 Most statutes did not pre-
scribe substantive criteria or procedures for the waiver process,
thereby allowing waiver decisions to be made in an informal and
subjective manner and predicated on unfettered discretion.
57
50 See Rudman, supra note 23; Bortner, Traditional Rhetoric, Organizational Realities: Re-
mand of Juveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 53 (1986); D. HAMPARIAN & R.
SCHUSTER, YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS, supra note 12.
51 Zimring, Notes Toward a Jurisprudence of Waiver, in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 1, at
193.
52 See Emerson, On Last Resorts, 87 AM.J. Soc. 1 (1981).
53 Most states regard a waiver of jurisdiction as an irrevocable act. Thus, once an
adolescent is transferred to criminal court for a criminal offense, all subsequent charges
against that juvenile are regarded as criminal offenses and are adjudicated in the crimi-
nal court. The transfer decision becomes an expulsion from the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court.
54 See Whitebread & Batey, The Role of Waiver in Juvenile Court: Questions of Philosophy
and Function, in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 1, at 207; Conrad, Crime and the Child, in MAJOR
ISSUES, supra note 1, at 179.
55 Flicker, Prosecuting Juveniles as Adults: A Symptom of a Crisis in the Juvenile Courts, in
MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 1, at 351.
56 Id.
57 See Feld, Reference ofJuvenile OffendersforAdult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to
Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REv. 515 (1978); Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets




In 1966, the Supreme Court, in Kent v. United States,58 struck
down the arbitrary procedures implicit in a District of Columbia
waiver provision, and held that a juvenile was entitled to a waiver
hearing, representation by counsel, access to information upon
which the waiver decision was based, and, a statement of reasons
upon which the waiver decision can be supported. In a non-binding
memorandum attached to the opinion in Kent, the majority indicated
eight factors that a waiver decision-maker might consider.59 How-
ever, the court did not, and to this day has not, struck down legisla-
tion providing for judicial waiver based on inherently general and
vague phrases such as: "amenability to treatment," "dangerous-
ness," "protection of the public," "best interests of the public wel-
fare," or, the nature of a youth's "family, school and social history."
Between 1978 :nd 1982, half of the state legislatures amended
their juvenile codes to simplify and expedite the transfer ofjuveniles
to criminal court for trial as adults.60 While a few states have as-
signed discretion to prosecutors to determine whether a complaint
originates in juvenile or criminal court, the primary mechanism for
referring youth to the criminal court remains the juvenile court's
waiver of jurisdiction. Forty-eight states, the District of Columbia,
and all federal jurisdictions authorize the juvenile court judge to
make the transfer decision. The judge must identify, often within
vague statutory guidelines, those juvenile offenders amenable to the
rehabilitative ministrations of the juvenile justice system and those
whose behaviors require the punitive sanction of the criminaljustice
system. Irrespective of the Kent memorandum and the descriptive
criteria found in the majority of statutory provisions on judicial
58 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
59 The Kent decision, although a procedural decision, cited specific factors and sub-
stantive criteria that a juvenile court might consider. They are as follows: (1) the seri-
ousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of the
community requires waiver; (2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggres-
sive, violent, or premeditated manner; (3) whether the offense was against persons or
property, with greater weight afforded to the offense against persons; (4) the probable
cause that the alleged complaint is founded in fact, and that a grand jury might return an
indictment; (5) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court,
when thejuvenile's associates are adults; (6) the sophistication and maturity of the juve-
nile as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional
attitude, and pattern of living; (7) the record and previous history of thejuvenile, includ-
ing prior contacts with the juvenile court and other law enforcement agencies, probation
supervision, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions; and (8) the prospects for
adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the
juvenile by use of the rehabilitative facilities and services currently available to the Juve-
nile Court. 383 U.S. at 566-68.
60 See D. HAMPARIAN, THE YOUNG CRIMINAL YEARS, supra note 5.
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waiver, broad discretion surrounds the transfer decision.6 1 The im-
portant issue this raises is whether this type of discretion results in
decisions that are inequitable, discriminatory, or inconsistent.
In most states, the substantive rules that govern the decision to
transfer provide both objective and discretionary criteria. While
age, charge and prior record are objectively defined, vague criteria
such as "dangerousness" or "amenability to treatment" provide fer-
tile ground for subjective interpretation in judgment. As the
number of subjective or standardless factors to be considered in-
crease, so too do opportunities for selection and emphasis of discre-
tionary factors that then shape the outcome of individual cases. 62
On the other hand, as the severity of the offense becomes para-
mount in the waiver decision, discretionary and subjective standards
of culpability and mens rea become secondary considerations as
waiver becomes the ultimate outcome of a retributive juvenile "sen-
tencing" decision.
Despite the common use of transfer, there has been little empir-
ical research that has examined the determinants of the judicial
transfer decision for violent juvenile offenders. Specifically, there
have been few attempts to empirically discern the types of offenses
or offenders that meet judicial perceptions of the "dangerousness"
or "amenability to treatment" standards found in transfer statutes.
Hamparian analyzed the application of judicial waiver statutes and
found they were arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory. 63 Fur-
ther, she found little explanation for the high degree of variation in
transfer decisions. 64 Keiter studied characteristics of youth trans-
ferred to criminal court in Cook County, Illinois. 65 Keiter's study, a
retrospective analysis, suggested that lack of decision-making crite-
ria "invites abuse" in the transfer decision.66 Eigen examined the
determinants of waiver in Pennsylvania for homicide and robbery.67
For interracial offenses, the accused juvenile's race carried signifi-
cant weight in the outcome of the transfer decision, as did the
youth's prior incarceration history.
68
61 Rudman, supra note 23.
62 Zimring, Notes Toward a Jurisprudence of Waiver, in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 1, at
193.
63 See D. HAMPARIAN, THE YOUNG CRIMINAL YEARS, supra note 12.
64 Id.
65 Keiter, Criminal or Delinquent? A Study ofJuvenile Cases Transferred to the Criminal Court,
19 CRIME & DELINQ. 528 (1973).
66 Id
67 Eigen, The Determinants and Impact ofJurisdictional Transfer in Philadelphia, in MAJOR
ISSUES, supra note 1, at 333.
68 Id; see also D. HAMPARIAN, THE YOUNG CRIMINAL YEARS, supra note 12 (finding that
minority youth were a majority of those transferred in 11 states); Fagan, Slaughter &
1990]
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However, selection bias has been a pervasive shortcoming of
prior research on comparative sanctions in juvenile and criminal
court.69 Prior research on juveniles in criminal court has relied on
samples that were purposively channeled from juvenile to adult ju-
risdictions, introducing selection biases into comparisons of the two
types of proceedings. For example, Osbun and Rode compared
transfer decisions for a heterogeneous offender population, but did
not control for the seriousness of prior and current offenses in as-
sessing the efficiency of objective versus discretionary criteria in
making transfer decisions. 70 Rudman compared sentencing for vio-
lent delinquents in juvenile court with those transferred to criminal
court pursuant to ajudicial determination regarding "amenability to
treatment" and "dangerousness." 7' Both Fagan et al. and Eigen
found that race influenced the transfer decision only for homicides,
but other factors (e.g., victim age) were influential for other types of
charges. 72 Thomas and Bilchik included data on juveniles either se-
lected into criminal court by prosecutors with concurrent jurisdic-
tion (i.e. direct filing) or waived by juvenile court judges pursuant to
a prosecutorial motion.
73
D. THE PRESENT STUDY
Little empirical research has been completed on the factors that
guide transfer decisions to determine whether transfer decisions are
based on standards derived from statutory criteria or other extra-
legal discretionary factors. The lack of empirical evidence makes it
unclear whether the statutorily-based transfer criteria are applied in
a way that selects a qualitatively more appropriate class of defend-
ants for eligibility for the harsher sanctions of the criminal court.
Whether these criteria in fact guide transfer decisions, or whether
extra-legal or other unstated factors explain the differences in trans-
Hartstone, Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on the Juvenile Justice Process, 33 CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 224 (1987) (finding substantial disparities in the transfer rates of minority and
white violent juveniles).
69 McCarthy & Smith, The Conceptualization of Discrimination in the Juvenile Justice Process:
The Impact of Administrative Factors and Screening Decisions on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24
CRIMINOLOGY 41 (1986).
70 Osbun & Rode, Prosecuting Juveniles as Adults: The Quest for Objective Decisions, 22
CRIMINOLOGY 187 (1984).
71 Rudman, supra note 23.
72 Fagan, Forst & Vivona, Racial Determinants of the Judicial Transfer Decision: Prosecuting
Violent Youths in the Criminal Court, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 259 (1987); see also Eigen, The
Determinants and Impact ofJurisdictional Transfer in Philadelphia, in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note
1, at 333 (on racial bias in transfer decision).
73 Thomas & Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analy-
sis, 76J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439 (1985).
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fer decisions, remains a critical question to assess whether the policy
goals and theories ofjustice are met through current transfer proce-
dures. That is the purpose of the study reported here.
II. DATA AND METHODS
Data were collected in four urban juvenile courts (Boston, De-
troit, Newark, and Phoenix) in 1981-84 for a sample of (N=201)
youth against whom prosecutors filed petitions for transfer.74 Eligi-
ble subjects were selected from an offense-based definition of vio-
lent juvenile offender using the following criteria: first, the current
offense must have been violent (murder/attempted murder,
rape/attempted rape, aggravated assault, armed robbery, arson of
an occupied dwelling, kidnapping); and second, the subjects must
have had a prior adjudication for a felonious person or property of-
fense. Only those youth who faced a current charge of murder in
the first degree were exempt from the prior adjudication require-
ment. In each court, the judge decided on the motions. Fewer than
half the youths considered for transfer (76, or 38%) were removed
to criminal court; the remainder (125, or 62%) were retained by the
juvenile court for adjudication.
To identify the determinants of the transfer decision, character-
istics of those youth transferred to the criminal court were com-
pared with those youth retained by the juvenile court. Data were
collected from juvenile court records, police arrest reports, and
court histories. Information was recorded on the following: the date
of offense, the charges filed at apprehension and at conviction, the
dates of various hearings and court appearances, the date of the
transfer decision, the date of conviction, and the final transfer deci-
sion. Information about the offense (e.g., number of victims, age
and race of victims, number of co-participants) and information
about the offender (e.g., race, age, mental health history, offense
record and placement history) were also recorded.
Statutory criteria and prior empirical research on transfer75
74 Data collection, which began in 1981, included cases filed in three sites, and was
expanded to Detroit cases filed in 1982. Data collection continued for varying periods at
each site due to anomalies in access and record keeping systems, ending in 1983 in
Boston, Phoenix and Newark, and 1984 in Detroit. Though period effects may possibly
influence sample characteristics, the rigid legal characteristics for sample selection and
narrow time frames minimized these threats. There were no changes in statute during
the study period in any of the states, limiting contextual effects on transfer decisions.
75 Eigen, supra note 72; D. HAMPARIAN, THE YOUNG CRIMINAL YEARS, supra note 12;
Osbun & Rode, ProsecutingJuveniles as Adults: The Quest for Objective Decisions, 22 CRIMINOL-
OGY 187 (1984); Rudman, supra note 23; Rudman, Hartstone, Fagan & Moore, Violent
Youth in Adult Court: Process and Punishment, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 75 (1986); Feld, The
1990] 329
FAGAN AND DESCHENES
were examined to identify operational definitions that represent the
decision standards for "amenability to treatment," "dangerous-
ness," and other characteristics of the offense and offender men-
tioned in waiver statutes. 76 Analyses comparing transferred and
retained youth were conducted to examine the relationships be-
tween the transfer decision and the statutory criteria and extra-legal
characteristics of the offenses and offenders. As might be assumed,




Within each state, the juvenile court's authority to waive juris-
diction is derived from statutes that define which juvenile offenders
may be excluded from the juvenile court process based on a motion
or nomination by the prosecutor, and the granting of the motion by
thejudge. To understand the determinants of transfer in these four
locales, it is first necessary to outline the statutory structure for judi-
cial waiver within each state. Statutes in all four study states provide
age, offense and "other" criteria to guide the judicial waiver deci-
sion. 77 Table 1 describes the criteria for Massachusetts, Michigan,
New Jersey, and Arizona.
The four statutes provide a mix of specific and non-specific cri-
teria that serve as the only "official" guidelines for the juvenile court
judge's transfer decision. While the age of initial criminal court ju-
risdiction is precise, as is the minimum age at which judicial waiver
is allowed (in all states but Arizona), offense restriction criteria con-
tain vague terminology. The statutes do not provide operational
definitions of the criteria that serve as the standards for the judges
decision. Such vagueness, however, is tempered by interpretations
found in case law.78
The range of legal criteria is broad, from any offense (in Ari-
zona) to specific penal code statutes or lists of violent offenses (in
Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes,
78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987); Keiter, Criminal or Delinquent? A Study ofJuve-
nile Cases Transferred to the Criminal Court, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 528 (1973); Bortner, Tradi-
tional Rhetoric, Organizational Realities: Remand of Juveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIME &
DELINQ. 53 (1986).
76 In some of the cross-classification analyses, the independent variables were dichot-
omized not only to simplify analyses, but also to increase cell sizes.
77 MASS. GEN L., ch. 119, § 61 (1990); MIc:H. COMP. LAws § 712A.4 (1990); N.J. REV.
STAT. §§ 2A:4A-48, -49 (1990); ARIZ. R. OF PRO. FOR JUVENILE CT., R. 12-14 (1988).
78 Feld, supra note 75.
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New Jersey and Massachusetts). Massachusetts further qualifies this
restriction by including a prior juvenile corrections commitment.
Still other qualifiers include attributions of intent or malice. Such
provisions may increase the burden of proof to prosecutors by en-
compassing extra-legal factors. Nevertheless, "legal" meaning may
be attributed to such phrases as "threat of bodily harm," or offenses
committed in an "aggressive, violent or willful manner."
It is when the statutes attempt to set out general criteria such as
"amenability to treatment" and "dangerousness" that the degree of
judicial discretion is revealed. Two states, Massachusetts and Michi-
gan, include in their statutes the seriousness of the alleged offense,
despite concurrent committing offense restrictions.7 9 Though all
four states mention "amenability," only two, Massachusetts and
Michigan, specifically mention criteria that operationalize the con-
cept. These operational definitions are vague, however, and are ex-
pressed in language such as "maturity," "patterns of living," and
"character." Two states, Michigan and Arizona, include an assess-
ment of the appropriateness of available placements for rehabilita-
tion of the offender. 80 Past treatment efforts and public safety are
also mentioned, though not consistently, as statutory criteria. Thus,
the four states' statutory schemes vary extensively in the breadth,
specificity, and generality of extra-legal as well as legal criteria for
the transfer decision.
Not only are the criteria discretionary, but so is the manner in
which the judges are to consider such criteria (see Table 1). For
example, in Massachusetts the court shall consider but "shall not be
limited to" a list of criteria. 81 In Michigan, the court must only
"consider" certain criteria. 82 The same element of discretion is also
found in the New Jersey statute that mandates that the court must
be "satisfied" that certain determinants are met.83 In Arizona, the
court "may" transfer a youth if "reasonable grounds" are present to
"believe" that specified elements are present.84 The extent to which
these criteria must be met differs depending on whether the court
merely "considers" them versus when the court is "satisfied" on
"reasonable grounds." In turn, the disparities in burden of proof
lead to differing procedures for transfer and judicial interpretations
of criteria.
79 See MASS. GEN. L., ch. 119, § 61 (1990); MICH. COMP. L. § 712A.4 (4)(b) (1989).
80 See MICH. COMP. L. § 769.1(10) (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-241 (1988).
81 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 119, § 62 (1990).
82 See MICH. COMP. LAWs § 712A.4 (1990).
83 See NJ. REV. STAT. § 2A:4-48 (1990).
84 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-241 (1988).
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B. CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSFERRED YOUTH
The possible determinants of transfer decisions through the ap-
plication of the statutory criteria were analyzed by comparing the
characteristics of transferred offenders with those retained in juve-
nile court.
1. Operational Definitions of Statutory Criteria
The statutory and discretionary clauses from Table 1 were
operationalized for the following factors: age at offense, type of vio-
lent offense, and prior offense history. Other factors associated with
decision-making in the juvenile court were also included as candi-
date determinants of the transfer decision; these factors were the
age at onset of the first offense, and the number of co-participants
and victims in the committing offense.8 5 Race, a factor associated
with disparity in judicial decision-making,86 also was included.
There appears to be a general consensus of the predictive rela-
tionship between early psychosocial development, age at onset of
delinquency, and subsequent delinquency and aggression. 87 Psy-
chologists suggest that the development of cognitive functioning
with respect to legal reasoning and ethical decision-making occurs
about the age of fourteen when youth have acquired moral and legal
values. 88 The ability to understand the difference between right and
wrong is a necessary component for mens rea, which often is a factor
applied in selecting the forum for adjudication. In addition, official
crime statistics show an increase in criminal activity starting at age
thirteen.89 In longitudinal research, age at onset has been shown to
be related to severity and chronicity of delinquency and adult crimi-
nality; juveniles who begin their criminal careers at earlier ages are
more likely to commit serious or violent offenses and to be frequent
85 McCarthy & Smith, The Conceptualization of Discrimination in the Juvenile Justice Process:
The Impact of Administrative Factors and Screening Decisions on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24
CRIMINOLOGY 41 (1986).
86 Thornberry, Race, Socioeconomic Status and Sentencing in the Juvenile Justice System, 64J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90 (1973); Thomberry, Sentencing Disparities in the Juvenile Justice
System, 70J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 164 (1979); Fagan, Forst & Vivona, Racial Determi-
nants of the Judicial Transfer Decision: Prosecuting Violent Youths in the Criminal Court, 33 CRIME
& DELIN9. 259 (1987); McCarthy & Smith, supra note 85.
87 See Loeber & Dishion, Early Predictors of Male Delinquency: A Review, 94 PSYCH. BULL.
68 (1983).
88 J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGEMENT OF THE CHILD (M. Gabain trans. 1966);
Kohlberg, The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order, 6 VITA HUMANA
11 (1963).
89 Weiner & Wolfgang, The Extent and Character of Violent Crime in America, 1969 to
1982, in AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN UPDATE OF THE NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 17 (L. Curtis ed. 1985).
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offenders. 90 Therefore, age at onset was dichotomized as thirteen
or younger or fourteen and older.
Statutory criteria limit the transfer decision to a specific subset
of offense types. The study sample further limits the subset of of-
fenses, since only violent offenses have been examined. However,
the offense categories capture several types of violent offenses, in-
cluding aggravated assault, sexual assault, instrumental violence
against persons (e.g., robbery), and capital offenses. Megargee sug-
gests a taxonomy of violence that distinguishes the etiology, corre-
lates, and context of these four types of violence. 9 ' Their variability
suggests possible differentials in both offender characteristics and
the perceptions of public danger or seriousness; accordingly, the
variability may contribute to patterns of judicial decision-making.
The analyses therefore examine differences by type of offense.
Two other characteristics of the offense-the number of co-par-
ticipants and victims-are hypothesized to affect the transfer deci-
sion. That youth violence occurs in groups is one of the well
established factors in criminality. 9 2 A greater number of offenders
may increase the desire to transfer for a deterrent effect, while a
greater number of victims may increase the desire for retributive
justice or public protection. Both these variables were dichoto-
mized-co-participants as none or some and victims one or
multiple.
2. Transfer Rates
Table 2 shows that the rate of youths transferred varies exten-
sively by juvenile court. Fewer than half the youths considered for
transfer were eventually transferred in Boston (21%), Detroit (31%)
and Newark (41%). However, in Phoenix the majority (71%) of vio-
lent delinquents considered for transfer were judicially waived to
the criminal court. Several factors may explain the differences in
decision patterns by site. The prevailing philosophy and crime con-
trol policy will certainly influence the rate of transfer. There may
also be varying definitions and interpretations of extra-legal factors
90 See M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT
(1972); Farrington, Self-Reports and Deviant Behavior: Predictive and Stable?, 64J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 99 (1973); D. HAMPARIAN, R. SCHUSTER, S. DINITZ &J. CONRAD, THE VIO-
LENT FEW: A STUDY OF DANGEROUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1978); D. HAMPARIAN, THE
YOUNG CRIMINAL YEARS, supra note 5; D. FARRINGTON, L. OHLIN & J. WILSON, UNDER-
STANDING AND CONTROLLING CRIME: TOWARD A NEW RESEARCH STRATEGY (1986).
91 Megargee, Psychological Determinants and Correlates of Criminal Violence, in CRIMINAL
VIOLENCE 112 (M. Wolfgang & N. Weiner eds. 1982).
92 See, e.g., Piper, Violent Recidivism and Chronicity in the 1958 Philadelphia Cohort, 1 J. OF
Q UANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 319 (1985).
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TABLE 2
OFFENSE AND OFFENDER CHARACrERiSTiCS OF WAIvED AND RE-
TAINED YOUTHS BY JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION (PERCENT)
a
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
Boston Detroit Newark Phoenix
Retained Waived Retained Waived Retained Waived Retained Waived
Race
White 77.8 22.2 87.5 12.5 0 0 40.0 60.0
Nonwhite 80.0 20.0 67.1 32.9 58.8 41.2 26.1 73.9
Age at Offense
14 50.0 50.0 0 0 0 100.0 0 100.0
15 100.0 0 78.0 22.0 66.7 33.3 100.0 0
16 75.0 25.0 61.5 38.5 61.5 38.5 50.0 50.0
17 0 0 0 0 58.1 41.9 0 100.0
Type of Offense
Murder 0 0 60.6 39.4 33.3 66.7 20.0 80.0
Kidnap 0 0 33.3 66.7 33.3 66.7 50.0 50.0
Forcible Rape 0 100.0 75.0 25.0 100.0 0 0 0
Aggravated Assault 75.0 25.0 77.5 22.6 94.1 5.9 33.3 66.7
Armed Robbery 100 0 71.4 28.6 41.2 58.8 14.3 85.7
Number of Victims
One 84.2 15.8 72.1 27.9 65.9 34.1 20.0 80.0
Two or more 70.0 30.0 60.0 40.0 30.0 70.0 38.5 61.5
Number of Co-Participants
None 75.0 25.0 72.4 27.6 75.0 25.0 36.4 63.6
One or more 81.0 19.0 67.2 32.8 53.8 46.2 25.0 75.0
Age at First Court Appearance
Less than 14 71.4 28.6 63.6 36.4 29.4 70.6 30.0 70.0
14- 17 86.7 13.3 71.7 28.3 73.5 26.5 27.8 72.2
N 23 6 64 29 30 21 8 20
Percentages are calculated for waived and retained youths within each offense or offender
characteristic.
such as "amenability to treatment." Additionally, there may be dif-
ferences in offender characteristics across sites, despite the fact that
all youth in the sample were adjudicated for violent offenses.
Differences in local custom and the comparative characteristics
of the justice systems also may bear on the transfer decision. Inter-
views With prosecutors in each site indicated quite dearly that the
primary purpose of the transfer decision was to obtain longer
sentences in secure care than could be obtained in the juvenile jus-
tice system.93 For example, the statutory limitations in Phoenix con-
strain the dispositional options ofjuvenile court judges, specifically
in the length of incarceration. Juvenile court jurisdiction for correc-
tions ends at eighteen years of age. Consequently, prosecutors
93 Rudman, supra note 23.
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sought transfer on nearly all juvenile offenders over seventeen years
of age.94 In other sites, the availability of secure placement or long-
term incarceration in the juvenile system may afford longer terms of
commitment and broader options within the juvenile system.
3. Legal and Extra-Legal Characteristics of Transferred Youths
The relationship between race and transfer is examined in Ta-
ble 2. No white youths were considered for transfer in Newark. In
Detroit and Phoenix, transfer rates were higher for minority youths
than for whites. This hints broadly at racial discrimination. There
are competing explanations for these initial findings, however. It is
possible, for example, that African-American youths are more likely
to have committed specific crimes or possess some other personal
characteristics that are more closely associated with transfer. Minor-
ity adolescents have a proportionately higher participation in violent
crimes. 95 The number of prior charges and adjudications also may
contribute to differences by race. 96 Thus, the relationship between
race and prior record may obscure important relationships between
race and the transfer decision.
Age at offense by itself is associated with the transfer decision in
only one site, Phoenix. Because the statutory age of maximum juve-
nile jurisdiction varies among the states, age at offense also can be
examined as a function of the time interval between the offense and
the jurisdictional age limit. Accordingly, the closer the proximity of
the age at offense to the age ceiling for juvenile court jurisdiction,
the greater the number of youths for whom transfer will be sought.
In Boston and Detroit, the age limit is seventeen, but Newark and
Phoenix have a court age-jurisdiction of eighteen.
Table 2 shows that in Boston, Detroit and Phoenix, a greater
percentage of youths whose age was within one year of the court
jurisdictional limit were transferred to adult court. The interval
from age at offense to the juvenile corrections jurisdiction limit does
appear to be related to the transfer decision in three of four sites.
Age at offense, therefore, is likely to covary with its proximity to the
94 This practice was formalized in policy. A policy memorandum from the chief pros-
ecuting attorney for juvenile court instructed assistant prosecutors to automatically file
transfer motions when if the juvenile was 17 years of age. See Rudman, supra note 23.
95 Weiner & Wolfgang, The Extent and Character of Violent Crime in America, 1969 to
1982, in AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN UPDATE OF THE NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 17 (L. Curtis ed. 1985).
96 McCarthy & Smith, The Conceptualization of Discrimination in the Juvenile Justice Process:




maximum punishment term in juvenile corrections as an influence
on judicial transfer decisions.
Table 2 also suggests that factors other than age and race may
explain the judicial waiver decision. The type of violent offense in
the petition to transfer may also be a determinant. Statutory lan-
guage suggests that transfer is more likely for a more serious com-
mitting offense. Even among a homogeneous group of violent
offenses, there are differences in victim injury and perceptions of
crime severity.97 Accordingly, a more heinous offense or greater in-
jury to the victim is more likely to result in a decision to transfer.
Such logic would presume a higher transfer rate for capital offenses.
However, as found earlier, the patterns vary. For example, none of
the youths charged with murder in Boston were transferred. In De-
troit, 40% of youth charged with murder were transferred com-
pared to 67% in Newark and 80% in Phoenix.98
Other committing offenses showed similar variability. None of
the eight youths in Boston charged with armed robbery were trans-
ferred; in comparison, Detroit transferred 29%, Newark 59%, and
Phoenix 86%. Similar variation exists for youths charged with ag-
gravated assault. In Newark, only 6% of youths charged with aggra-
vated assault were transferred; however, in Boston, 25% were
transferred, in Detroit 23%, and in Phoenix 67%. 99 For Newark,
there was a significant statistical difference between homicide, kid-
napping and robbery as opposed to aggravated assault and rape.
Accordingly, the juvenile courts appear to view violent juvenile
crime as a heterogeneous category with respect to its bearing on the
limits ofjuvenile jurisdiction. While for some cases the type or con-
sequence of the offense determines the transfer decision, for others,
the age at offense mediates that decision. The trends for homicide
are particularly noteworthy for understanding the age-crime rela-
tionship to the transfer decision: murder, a capital offense, resulted
in extreme variation.
Two situational factors that surround the committing offense
also were examined-the number of victims and co-participants. If
97 Rossi, Waite, Boise & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individ-
ual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 224 (1974); M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO, P. TRAcy & S.
SINGER, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY (monograph prepared for the Bureau
ofJustice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Just., 1985).
98 In Phoenix, two of the youths charged with murder were 17 years of age, and were
subject to the systematic filing of transfer motions consistent with prosecutorial policy.
With routine granting of the motion, this procedure was tantamount to a prosecutorial
waiver.
99 In Phoenix, nearly all transferred youths were 17 years of age or older, and were
likely to be considered for transfer regardless of their committing offense.
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the alleged offense involved multiple victims, we hypothesized that
youths would more likely be transferred since the numbers of vic-
tims may be viewed as a measure of the severity of the offense and
the implied threat to public safety. 100 Table 2 shows that there is, in
fact, a significant association between the number of victims and the
likelihood of transfer; in Newark, 70% of the offenders with multi-
ple victims were transferred compared to 34% of those with only
one victim. In Boston, 16% of the youths were waived when the
committing offense involved only one victim, compared to 30%
when two or more victims were involved. In Detroit, 28% were
waived with only one victim, while 40% were waived with two or
more victims. However, in Phoenix, a reverse pattern was found:
80% were waived where the offense had only one victim, compared
to 62% with two or more victims.
A second factor, the presence of co-participants, may influence
the decision to transfer in one of two ways. Juvenile offending is
often viewed as a group or "wolfpack" phenomenon, 0 1 and a large
number of co-participants may induce the juvenile courts to effect a
transfer because of the perceived public threat of group criminal ac-
tivity. On the other hand, the absence of accomplices may be
viewed by the juvenile courts as a sign of a shift from juvenile to
adult behavior patterns, indicating the lone offender is a fit candi-
date for transfer. However, as is shown in Table 2, the number of
co-participants was not an important factor in most sites.
The age at onset of delinquency is thought to be a predictor of
adult criminality.' 0 2 Table 2 shows that in three of four sites, age at
onset is associated with the transfer decision. In Newark, 71% of
those who began their criminal careers at an early age were trans-
ferred, compared to 26% of those who began at age fourteen or
older. In Boston and Detroit, a larger proportion of youths with a
younger age at onset were more likely to be transferred than youths
with later initiation into delinquency. Phoenix again offers a differ-
ent trend from the other sites as there appear to be no differences
between those fourteen years old and over and those thirteen and
under. Accordingly, juvenile court judges apparently regard the
length of the delinquent career and an early start as important in-
100 M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO, P. TRACY & S. SINGER, supra note 97.
101 Piper, Violent Recidivism and Chronicity in the 1958 Philadelphia Cohort, I J. OF QUANTI-
TATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 319 (1985).
102 See, e.g., P. GREENWOOD, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION REVISITED: WHY THE HIGH-
RATE OFFENDERS ARE HARD TO PREDICT (monograph prepared for Nat'l Inst. ofJust.,
U.S. Dep't ofJust., 1982); Loeber & Dishion, Early Predictors of Male Delinquency: A Review,
94 PSYCH. BULL. 68 (1983).
[Vol. 81338
JUVENILE WAIVER
dicators of statutory guidelines such as "amenability to treatment."
Moreover, an early start also provides a longer period of time for
youths to accumulate a record of offenses, reciprocally contributing
to the important influence of prior record in the interpretation of
"amenability."
A direct relationship between the mean number of prior of-
fenses and the percentage of youths transferred exists in three of
the four sites. However, this finding may be redundant with the pre-
vious finding: an early age of onset is highly correlated with the
length of career and in turn the number of prior petitions. Overall,
in Boston, Detroit, and Newark, the higher the mean number of
prior offenses, the more likely was a transfer. The opposite was true
in Phoenix.
Figure 1 compares the mean number of prior juvenile court pe-
titions for waived and retained youths in each locale. The differ-
ences in the aggregate rates across locales illustrates the importance
of local customs in comparative analysis ofjuvenile justice process-
ing of youths considered for transfer. Newark youths have far more
prior petitions and prior adjudications than similar youths in the
other sites.' 03 Whether the lengthier prior histories in Newark are
products of criminal activity, intensive police activity, or
prosecutorial focus cannot be discerned from the data sources avail-
able to the study. In Boston and Detroit, there appears, on simple
observation, to be much less prior offense activity than in Newark.
Phoenix differs here as elsewhere in these analyses. It is the
only site where the youths transferred to criminal court have fewer
prior offenses and adjudications than those retained by the juvenile
court. The automatic prosecutorial transfer policy offers a salient
explanation of the Phoenix phenomenon, where the age ceiling on
juvenile jurisdiction eclipses other factors in explaining the transfer
decision. Such prosecutorial aggressiveness may also explain the
higher rate of adjudication in Phoenix relative to the number of
prior petitions. In other sites, the ratio of adjudications to petitions
is considerably lower. 10 4 The varying rates across sites also may re-
flect the unique aspects of the norms and social organization ofju-
venile justice processing across jurisdictions. Stapleton, Aday and
103 Analysis of prior adjudications revealed identical patterns. There also are interac-
tions between prior record and age with respect to the transfer decision. Prior record
becomes less important as a determinant of transfer for youths with less than one year to
the age limit ofjuvenile courtjurisdiction. See Fagan, Forst & Vivona, Racial Determinants
















Boston Detroit Newark Phoenix
Juvenile Court
Waived M Retained
Ito10 5 and Rudman 10 6 documented the contributions factors such as
the formality of system processing and the standards of documenta-
tion required to enter a court petition have made to court decisions.
Such varied practices contribute to divergent case outcomes for
both violent and non-serious offenses.
C. PREDICTION AND CLASSIFICATION OF WAIVER DECISIONS
There is substantial variation across jurisdictions in the factors
that differentiate transferred and retained youths among violent ad-
olescent offenders. This suggests important differences in the appli-
cation of statutory criteria and the definitions of the threshold of
adult responsibility for crime. However, differences in the relative
importance of the statutory criteria imply significant differences in
implicit policies regarding the underlying theories of waiver and in-
terpretations of the limits of juvenile jurisprudence and the parens
patriae philosophy.
Accordingly, discriminant analysis was used to determine the
relative contributions of extra-legal and offense criteria to judicial
105 Stapleton, Aday & Ito, An Empirical Typology of American Metropolitan Juvenile Courts,
88 AM. Soc. REv. 549 (1982).
106 Rudman, supra note 23.
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waiver decisions.10 7 From the actual criteria that explain or predict
the judicial transfer decision, we may infer the policies or theories
that guide waiver practices. Table 3 presents results of discriminant
models developed individually for each site, and for an aggregate
model combining data for all sites.
TABLE 3
DIScRnVUmNANT ANALYSIS OF TRANSFER DEcISIoN BY OFFENSE AND




Characteristics Boston Detroit Newark Phoenix Total
Race .35
Age at Onset -. 67 -. 75 -. 49
Age at Offense .71 .42 1.02 .58
Type of Offense:
- Rape 1.01
- Armed Robbery -. 69 .53 .58 .23
- Murder .64 .80 .58 .62
- Aggravated Assault
Number of Victims .41 .40 .22
Prior Adjudications .70
Sitelb NA NA NA NA .60
STATISTICS
7 Correctly Classified 86.2 67.7 66.7 85.7 70.7
Eigenvalue .57 .17 .57 .51 .24
Wilkes Lambda .64 .85 .64 .66 .81
Canonical Correlation .60 .39 .60 .58 .44
Chi Squared 11.3 14.4 21.1 10.2 42.2
p .02 .01 .000 .02 .000
Each site was entered as a dummy variable in the aggregate model. Only Phoenix entered
the final discriminant function.
The most consistent contributors across sites were the age at
offense (older youths were transferred more often), age at onset
(youths whose delinquent histories started at an earlier age were
transferred more often), and youths charged with murder. In fact,
specific offense types (murder and armed robbery) contributed to
the models in two of the four sites as well as the aggregate model.
However, the negative coefficient for armed robbery in Boston indi-
cated that this offense type was less likely to be transferred. In two
sites, Boston and Newark, offense type contributed more than other
107 W. KLECKA, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS (1980); W. COOLEY & P. LOHNES, MUL-
TIVARIATE PROCEDURES FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (1962). Other multivariate meth-
ods were not used due to the nonskewed distribution of the dependent variable.
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characteristics. In Boston, rape was the strongest contributor,
whereas murder was the strongest contributor in Newark.
Race entered the model in only the Detroit site, but it had the
lowest coefficient of the discriminating variables. Detroit had the
highest percentage of homicide cases, and minority youths charged
with homicide were transferred more often than their white counter-
parts. Race did not enter the aggregate model, though race may be
associated with prior criminal history.'08 However, prior petitions
did not enter any of the models, and prior adjudications contributed
to transfer only in Detroit. The absence of race as an explanatory
variable may be the result of the sample population of violent of-
fenders with high participation of minority youths. Other offenses
or individual characteristics did not consistently enter across sites.
For example, the number of victims in the committing offense was a
relatively weak discriminator in two sites.
The models ranged in classification efficiency from moderate in
two sites (about two in three cases correctly classified) to very strong
(seven in eight cases correctly classified) in two other sites. The ag-
gregate model also had a moderate classification score. Among the
offense characteristics, only the number of victims was a salient dis-
criminator-though a weak one- in any of the models. Finally,
only Phoenix was a discriminator in the aggregate model among the
sites. This last finding suggests that factors which were not included
in this model contributed to transfer in Phoenix. The stringent ju-
risdictional limit for juvenile corrections (at age eighteen) distin-
guished Phoenix from the other locales and may explain its unique
contribution to the explanatory model.
IV. DiscusSION
Children have traditionally been given special consideration in
our society. Yet the boundaries of childhood are at best artificial. 0 9
Society has varying definitions of the end of childhood for different
purposes or responsibilities: the right to vote (at age eighteen) or
marry (as young as age sixteen without parental consent), the au-
thority to drive an automobile unaccompanied by an adult (as young
as age sixteen in some states), eligibility for the armed forces (age
eighteen), the right to drink alcohol (age twenty-one in nearly all
states), and so forth. Obviously, the debate is unending as to when
108 McCarthy & Smith, The Conceptualization of Discrimination in the Juvenile Justice Process:
The Impact of Administrative Factors and Screening Decisions on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24
CRIMINOLOGY 41 (1986); Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone, BlindJustice? The Impact of Race
on the Juvenile Justice Process, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 224 (1987).
109 Conrad, Crime and the Child, in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 1, at 179.
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the notion of childhood as a "state of unreadiness" ends and the age
threshold when sanction sensitivity is sufficient to merit criminal or
punitive responses. 1 0
The changes in court jurisdiction and transfer practices in de-
linquency matters signal shifts in the philosophical and theoretical
underpinnings of juvenile justice policy. This in turn suggests
changes in society's views of adolescence and the limits of the state's
power to affect moral development. At its core is a debate over who
is a child, and therefore, who is deserving of special consideration or
protection. The once clear demarcation at age eighteen between
the juvenile and criminal justice systems is moving steadily toward a
more varied approach encompassing features both of the offense
and the offender. The general trend is toward a lower age of crimi-
nal jurisdiction, especially for violent juvenile offenders. " ' Behind
this trend is a fairly explicit policy goal, namely to punish more se-
verely violent juvenile offenders through longer terms of incarcera-
tion. Evidently, the criminal court presents the most efficient forum
for achieving this goal.
The downward trend in the age of adult responsibility for crimi-
nal acts and the increasing use of transfers suggest that there are a
variety of behaviors and personal attributes that may signal an end
to adolescence, and that efforts aimed at moral or social develop-
ment are no longer appropriate. Furthermore, the variation in ideas
about the end of adolescence is reflected in a variety of statutory
schemes regarding transfer criteria. In some states, policies to put
these new social concerns into operation are keyed to the offender
(in terms of age, prior crimes, and earlier attempts to rectify delin-
quency). In other states, the limits of juvenile jurisdiction are de-
fined by the offense: those charged with certain offenses are
deemed beyond rehabilitation. In these states, transfer to criminal
court may serve the goals of retributive justice, deterrence, or inca-
pacitation. 112 Still other states have chosen to combine age, back-
ground, and crime in a "flexible" policy that embraces parts of both
systems. These discretionary policies suggest that there is an age-
crime relationship that may inform decisions as to whether rehabili-
110 p. GREENWOOD, J. PETERSILIA & F. ZIMRING, AGE, CRIME AND SANCTION: THE
TRANSrrION FROMJUVENILE TO ADULT COURT (monograph prepared for the Office ofJuv.
and Delinq. Prev., Dep't ofJust., 1980).
111 Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile
Waiver Statutes, 78 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987).
112 Thomas & Bilchik, ProsecutingJuveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analy-
sis, 76J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439 (1985).
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tation or punishment is more likely to reduce crime for certain
offenders.
There are important questions regarding the threshold of ado-
lescence. To the extent that the correlates of crime are unrelated to
age, it may matter little at what age we choose to punish, rather than
to provide assistance for, an offender. We know that age alone is
not an efficient predictor of sustained involvement in crime. Why
then should policy be linked to age-offense thresholds when the de-
cline in crime with age characterizes even the most active and vio-
lent offenders?" 3 There appears to be little empirical justification
for age-based definitions of juvenile jurisdiction. Similarly, impos-
ing behavior-specific limits on juvenile jurisdiction suggests that
there are salient etiological distinctions between juvenile and adult
criminality. Such policies rely on an age-behavior relationship that
indicates when rehabilitative intervention becomes extraneous to
the causes of crime. Accordingly, some sixteen year old offenders
may be less amenable to treatment than others based either on ex-
tra-legal factors or patterns of prior delinquency.
The contributions of age to the transfer decision do not imply
that judges consider factors in adolescent development regarding
age and its relation to amenability to treatment. Age also is related
to jurisdiction. As youths approach the maximum age of juvenile
corrections jurisdiction, or the ceiling of punishment, prosecutors
and judges evidently weigh the capacity for punishment as a juve-
nile. Judges may view the limits on punishment as insufficient for
certain categories of offenses or offenders. This was particularly evi-
dent in Phoenix, where the state Supreme Court held that juvenile
corrections jurisdiction ends at age eighteen, the age of majority." 4
Accordingly, the salient age-related factor for transfer is not only a
developmental consideration, but also the age/punishment calculus.
The operationalization of age, offense, and amenability criteria
poses further complex questions. In most states, the burden of
proof remains on the state to provide convincing evidence that
processing an adolescent in juvenile court would be either ineffec-
tive or pose a threat to the community." 5 What is the age threshold
when certain behaviors signify that character is formed beyond the
intervention of contemporary treatment programs? How have the
juvenile courts and the legislatures codified these empirical ques-
tions? And what have been the consequences in consistency of deci-
113 Hirschi & Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM.J. Soc. 552 (1983).
114 See In the Matter of the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 149 Ariz. 35, 716
P.2d 404 (1986) (en banc).
115 Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 112.
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sion-making from the current statutes that define the legal limits of
adolescence?
This paper has examined the judicial transfer decision for vio-
lent youths in four urban juvenile courts. Violent youths account
for less than one-third of all youths transferred, yet they are a cen-
tral focus ofjuvenile justice attention. Accordingly, initial expecta-
tions that virtually all violent youths would be transferred were not
met. Nor was there consistency across site: the percentage of
youths transferred varied from a low of 21% in Boston to a high of
71%o' in Phoenix.
In order to test the variance in judicial decision-making, seven
offense and offender variables associated with amenability to treat-
ment and dangerousness were analyzed to identify determinants of
the transfer decision. Neither multivariate analysis nor simple ex-
plorations identified strong or consistent determinants of the judi-
cial transfer decision. Except for a relationship between extensive
prior offense history and the transfer decision, none of the identified
variables could significantly describe differences between youths
who were or were not transferred. Furthermore, classification and
prediction models of the transfer decision were not successful.
Large differences in transfer criteria were found across sites.
The absence of uniform criteria used by juvenile court judges in
making the transfer decision is, by itself, an important finding. A
number of possible explanations may apply. First, because of the
small number of cases at each site, the wide variation in the propor-
tion of cases transferred and the lack of variation in the explanatory
variables, analyses may mask actual trends. We examined only vio-
lent offenders, yet they are not a homogeneous group, exhibiting
great diversity in age, delinquent careers, prior interventions, and
contexts surrounding their offenses. Second, it is likely that juvenile
court judges used additional criteria, not applied in this study, fac-
tors that may or may not be legallyjustified. Probation reports, fam-
ily histories and psychological evaluations may contribute to the
transfer decision. Outcomes of previous court interventions also
weigh on judges. It is difficult to measure empirically the extent to
which the nature and type of such reports, histories, and evaluations
may have influenced the judicial waiver decision. Other factors that
may be related to the transfer decision, such as the youth's dress or
demeanor in court, are difficult to assess quantitatively.
These informal criteria and the statutory language that seem to
guide the transfer decision are subjective and may invite disparity, if
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not capriciousness by prosecutors and judges.1 16 The absence of
formal criteria, coupled with the apparent "natural" transfer crite-
ria, has two central implications for juvenile justice policy and delin-
quency theory. First, even when guided by broad, non-specific
standards lacking operational criteria, judges appear to focus on ra-
tional, concrete factors in the transfer decision. To the extent that
criteria for transfer should be formalized to support uniformity and
reduce disparity in the decision making process, such legislative cri-
teria should reasonably relate to the offender's age and the severity
of the charged offense. Feld, for example, argues that the determi-
native factors should be restricted to a narrow range of offense-spe-
cific factors.1
7
Second, transfer is a process resulting from multiple discretion-
ary screening points. The sensitivity of the transfer decision to
prosecutorial charging decisions has increased as legislatures have
broadened the criteria for transfer eligibility. Transfer is a serious
decision that addresses jurisdiction for sentencing and punishment,
not guilt; in the end, it focuses on the severity of punishment.
Vague and broad legislative criteria may invite prosecutors to re-
gard transfer as a disguised plea bargain. Perhaps this explains the
variation in the rate of transfer motions granted. This was not the
intent of the juvenile court reformers who, nearly a century ago,
granted judges the authority to waive jurisdiction. Statutory change
regarding transfer should state criteria sufficiently concrete to dis-
courage such behaviors among prosecutors who diminish the signif-
icance of the transfer decision.
This study does challenge some pre-existing notions. The as-
sumption that judicial transfer decisions may be biased by age at
offense was not borne out by the data, except for a prosecutorial
policy in Phoenix to move for remand of seventeen-year-olds. More
important, unless there was prosecutorial racial selection, the deci-
sion to transfer youths in Boston, Detroit, Newark, and Phoenix was
not motivated by race. Additionally, circumstances surrounding the
offense, co-participation, and victimization did not contribute to ju-
dicial decisions to retain youths in the juvenile court or transfer
them to criminal court. Prior offense history and proximity to the
ceiling ofjuvenile jurisdiction appear to have the strongest relation-
ship to the judicial transfer decision. For violent delinquents, these
116 Wizner, Discretionary Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: An Invitation to Procedural
Arbitrariness, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHics 41 (1984).
117 Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile
Waiver Statutes, 78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987).
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factors appear to be independent of age, race, or committing of-
fense in determining transfer.
Judicial waiver statutes empower the juvenile court judge to
make a transfer decision without applying objective criteria. This is
not surprising for a system ofjustice that has traditionally individu-
alized its decisions. The question remains, what are the effects of
"individualized justice" on violent youths considered for transfer?
For those youths subject to transfer consideration, the data show
that judicial decisions were not discriminatory toward retaining a
youth within the juvenile justice system or waiving him to the crimi-
nal justice system. We found no bias with respect to race. However,
neither did we find a strong relationship between transfer and most
offense-related variables, including the nature of the offense,
number of co-participants or number of victims. What we found
was a rash of inconsistent judicial waiver decisions, both within and
across sites. Inconsistent and standardless decisions for youths re-
tained in the juvenile court are not surprising in a judicial context
that cherishes individualized justice, although even this notion is in-
creasingly subject to challenge.' 18 But for youths who may be tried
and convicted in criminal court and subjected to years of imprison-
ment in a secure institution, such subjective decision-making is no
longerjustified. This is not to suggest that there should be no varia-
tion in decision-making criteria and practices among states. Each
state has, naturally, lawful authority to decide which offense and of-
fender characteristics are relevant to the transfer decision. Within
states, however, the doctrines of fundamental fairness and equal
protection suggest that formal, articulated criteria should be estab-
lished to promote equitable and consistent transfer decision-
making.
118 Forst, Fisher & Coates, Indeterminate and Determinate Sentencing ofJuvenile Delinquents:
A National Survey of Approaches to Commitment and Release Decision-Making, 36 Juv. & FAM.
CT.J. 1 (1985).
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